add IP_FILTERLIST_BYPASS_HTTP_AUTH (#538)

* add IP_FILTERLIST_BYPASS_HTTP_AUTH

* refactor to separated ip whitelist
This commit is contained in:
Andrea Spacca 2023-03-12 13:34:41 +09:00 committed by GitHub
parent 54cacb5487
commit 1fb67f49ff
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6 changed files with 98 additions and 62 deletions

View file

@ -86,51 +86,52 @@ https://transfer.sh/1lDau/test.txt --> https://transfer.sh/inline/1lDau/test.txt
## Usage
Parameter | Description | Value | Env
--- |---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| --- |-----------------------------
listener | port to use for http (:80) | | LISTENER |
profile-listener | port to use for profiler (:6060) | | PROFILE_LISTENER |
force-https | redirect to https | false | FORCE_HTTPS
tls-listener | port to use for https (:443) | | TLS_LISTENER |
tls-listener-only | flag to enable tls listener only | | TLS_LISTENER_ONLY |
tls-cert-file | path to tls certificate | | TLS_CERT_FILE |
tls-private-key | path to tls private key | | TLS_PRIVATE_KEY |
http-auth-user | user for basic http auth on upload | | HTTP_AUTH_USER |
http-auth-pass | pass for basic http auth on upload | | HTTP_AUTH_PASS |
http-auth-htpasswd | htpasswd file path for basic http auth on upload | | HTTP_AUTH_HTPASSWD |
ip-whitelist | comma separated list of ips allowed to connect to the service | | IP_WHITELIST |
ip-blacklist | comma separated list of ips not allowed to connect to the service | | IP_BLACKLIST |
temp-path | path to temp folder | system temp | TEMP_PATH |
web-path | path to static web files (for development or custom front end) | | WEB_PATH |
proxy-path | path prefix when service is run behind a proxy | | PROXY_PATH |
proxy-port | port of the proxy when the service is run behind a proxy | | PROXY_PORT |
email-contact | email contact for the front end | | EMAIL_CONTACT |
ga-key | google analytics key for the front end | | GA_KEY |
Parameter | Description | Value | Env
--- |---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------
listener | port to use for http (:80) | | LISTENER |
profile-listener | port to use for profiler (:6060) | | PROFILE_LISTENER |
force-https | redirect to https | false | FORCE_HTTPS
tls-listener | port to use for https (:443) | | TLS_LISTENER |
tls-listener-only | flag to enable tls listener only | | TLS_LISTENER_ONLY |
tls-cert-file | path to tls certificate | | TLS_CERT_FILE |
tls-private-key | path to tls private key | | TLS_PRIVATE_KEY |
http-auth-user | user for basic http auth on upload | | HTTP_AUTH_USER |
http-auth-pass | pass for basic http auth on upload | | HTTP_AUTH_PASS |
http-auth-htpasswd | htpasswd file path for basic http auth on upload | | HTTP_AUTH_HTPASSWD |
http-auth-ip-whitelist | comma separated list of ips allowed to upload without being challenged an http auth | | HTTP_AUTH_IP_WHITELIST |
ip-whitelist | comma separated list of ips allowed to connect to the service | | IP_WHITELIST |
ip-blacklist | comma separated list of ips not allowed to connect to the service | | IP_BLACKLIST |
temp-path | path to temp folder | system temp | TEMP_PATH |
web-path | path to static web files (for development or custom front end) | | WEB_PATH |
proxy-path | path prefix when service is run behind a proxy | | PROXY_PATH |
proxy-port | port of the proxy when the service is run behind a proxy | | PROXY_PORT |
email-contact | email contact for the front end | | EMAIL_CONTACT |
ga-key | google analytics key for the front end | | GA_KEY |
provider | which storage provider to use | (s3, storj, gdrive or local) |
uservoice-key | user voice key for the front end | | USERVOICE_KEY |
aws-access-key | aws access key | | AWS_ACCESS_KEY |
aws-secret-key | aws access key | | AWS_SECRET_KEY |
bucket | aws bucket | | BUCKET |
s3-endpoint | Custom S3 endpoint. | | S3_ENDPOINT |
s3-region | region of the s3 bucket | eu-west-1 | S3_REGION |
s3-no-multipart | disables s3 multipart upload | false | S3_NO_MULTIPART |
s3-path-style | Forces path style URLs, required for Minio. | false | S3_PATH_STYLE |
storj-access | Access for the project | | STORJ_ACCESS |
storj-bucket | Bucket to use within the project | | STORJ_BUCKET |
basedir | path storage for local/gdrive provider | | BASEDIR |
gdrive-client-json-filepath | path to oauth client json config for gdrive provider | | GDRIVE_CLIENT_JSON_FILEPATH |
gdrive-local-config-path | path to store local transfer.sh config cache for gdrive provider | | GDRIVE_LOCAL_CONFIG_PATH |
gdrive-chunk-size | chunk size for gdrive upload in megabytes, must be lower than available memory (8 MB) | | GDRIVE_CHUNK_SIZE |
lets-encrypt-hosts | hosts to use for lets encrypt certificates (comma seperated) | | HOSTS |
log | path to log file | | LOG |
cors-domains | comma separated list of domains for CORS, setting it enable CORS | | CORS_DOMAINS |
clamav-host | host for clamav feature | | CLAMAV_HOST |
perform-clamav-prescan | prescan every upload through clamav feature (clamav-host must be a local clamd unix socket) | | PERFORM_CLAMAV_PRESCAN |
rate-limit | request per minute | | RATE_LIMIT |
max-upload-size | max upload size in kilobytes | | MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE |
purge-days | number of days after the uploads are purged automatically | | PURGE_DAYS |
purge-interval | interval in hours to run the automatic purge for (not applicable to S3 and Storj) | | PURGE_INTERVAL |
random-token-length | length of the random token for the upload path (double the size for delete path) | 6 | RANDOM_TOKEN_LENGTH |
uservoice-key | user voice key for the front end | | USERVOICE_KEY |
aws-access-key | aws access key | | AWS_ACCESS_KEY |
aws-secret-key | aws access key | | AWS_SECRET_KEY |
bucket | aws bucket | | BUCKET |
s3-endpoint | Custom S3 endpoint. | | S3_ENDPOINT |
s3-region | region of the s3 bucket | eu-west-1 | S3_REGION |
s3-no-multipart | disables s3 multipart upload | false | S3_NO_MULTIPART |
s3-path-style | Forces path style URLs, required for Minio. | false | S3_PATH_STYLE |
storj-access | Access for the project | | STORJ_ACCESS |
storj-bucket | Bucket to use within the project | | STORJ_BUCKET |
basedir | path storage for local/gdrive provider | | BASEDIR |
gdrive-client-json-filepath | path to oauth client json config for gdrive provider | | GDRIVE_CLIENT_JSON_FILEPATH |
gdrive-local-config-path | path to store local transfer.sh config cache for gdrive provider | | GDRIVE_LOCAL_CONFIG_PATH |
gdrive-chunk-size | chunk size for gdrive upload in megabytes, must be lower than available memory (8 MB) | | GDRIVE_CHUNK_SIZE |
lets-encrypt-hosts | hosts to use for lets encrypt certificates (comma seperated) | | HOSTS |
log | path to log file | | LOG |
cors-domains | comma separated list of domains for CORS, setting it enable CORS | | CORS_DOMAINS |
clamav-host | host for clamav feature | | CLAMAV_HOST |
perform-clamav-prescan | prescan every upload through clamav feature (clamav-host must be a local clamd unix socket) | | PERFORM_CLAMAV_PRESCAN |
rate-limit | request per minute | | RATE_LIMIT |
max-upload-size | max upload size in kilobytes | | MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE |
purge-days | number of days after the uploads are purged automatically | | PURGE_DAYS |
purge-interval | interval in hours to run the automatic purge for (not applicable to S3 and Storj) | | PURGE_INTERVAL |
random-token-length | length of the random token for the upload path (double the size for delete path) | 6 | RANDOM_TOKEN_LENGTH |
If you want to use TLS using lets encrypt certificates, set lets-encrypt-hosts to your domain, set tls-listener to :443 and enable force-https.

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@ -276,6 +276,12 @@ var globalFlags = []cli.Flag{
Value: "",
EnvVar: "HTTP_AUTH_HTPASSWD",
},
cli.StringFlag{
Name: "http-auth-ip-whitelist",
Usage: "comma separated list of ips allowed to upload without being challenged an http auth",
Value: "",
EnvVar: "HTTP_AUTH_IP_WHITELIST",
},
cli.StringFlag{
Name: "ip-whitelist",
Usage: "comma separated list of ips allowed to connect to the service",
@ -450,6 +456,13 @@ func New() *Cmd {
options = append(options, server.HTTPAuthHtpasswd(httpAuthHtpasswd))
}
if httpAuthIPWhitelist := c.String("http-auth-ip-whitelist"); httpAuthIPWhitelist != "" {
ipFilterOptions := server.IPFilterOptions{}
ipFilterOptions.AllowedIPs = strings.Split(httpAuthIPWhitelist, ",")
ipFilterOptions.BlockByDefault = false
options = append(options, server.HTTPAUTHFilterOptions(ipFilterOptions))
}
applyIPFilter := false
ipFilterOptions := server.IPFilterOptions{}
if ipWhitelist := c.String("ip-whitelist"); ipWhitelist != "" {

View file

@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
http-auth-user = mkOption { type = types.nullOr types.str; description = "user for basic http auth on upload"; };
http-auth-pass = mkOption { type = types.nullOr types.str; description = "pass for basic http auth on upload"; };
http-auth-htpasswd = mkOption { type = types.nullOr types.str; description = "htpasswd file path for basic http auth on upload"; };
http-auth-ip-whitelist = mkOption { type = types.nullOr types.str; description = "comma separated list of ips allowed to upload without being challenged an http auth"; };
ip-whitelist = mkOption { type = types.nullOr types.str; description = "comma separated list of ips allowed to connect to the service"; };
ip-blacklist = mkOption { type = types.nullOr types.str; description = "comma separated list of ips not allowed to connect to the service"; };
temp-path = mkOption { type = types.nullOr types.str; description = "path to temp folder"; };

View file

@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ import (
"github.com/ProtonMail/gopenpgp/v2/constants"
"github.com/dutchcoders/transfer.sh/server/storage"
"github.com/tg123/go-htpasswd"
"github.com/tomasen/realip"
web "github.com/dutchcoders/transfer.sh-web"
"github.com/gorilla/mux"
@ -1313,20 +1314,20 @@ func ipFilterHandler(h http.Handler, ipFilterOptions *IPFilterOptions) http.Hand
if ipFilterOptions == nil {
h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
} else {
WrapIPFilter(h, *ipFilterOptions).ServeHTTP(w, r)
WrapIPFilter(h, ipFilterOptions).ServeHTTP(w, r)
}
}
}
func (s *Server) basicAuthHandler(h http.Handler) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if s.AuthUser == "" || s.AuthPass == "" || s.AuthHtpasswd == "" {
if s.authUser == "" || s.authPass == "" || s.authHtpasswd == "" {
h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
if s.htpasswdFile == nil && s.AuthHtpasswd != "" {
htpasswdFile, err := htpasswd.New(s.AuthHtpasswd, htpasswd.DefaultSystems, nil)
if s.htpasswdFile == nil && s.authHtpasswd != "" {
htpasswdFile, err := htpasswd.New(s.authHtpasswd, htpasswd.DefaultSystems, nil)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
@ -1335,20 +1336,29 @@ func (s *Server) basicAuthHandler(h http.Handler) http.HandlerFunc {
s.htpasswdFile = htpasswdFile
}
if s.authIPFilter == nil && s.authIPFilterOptions != nil {
s.authIPFilter = newIPFilter(s.authIPFilterOptions)
}
w.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", "Basic realm=\"Restricted\"")
var authorized bool
if s.authIPFilter != nil {
remoteIP := realip.FromRequest(r)
authorized = s.authIPFilter.Allowed(remoteIP)
}
username, password, authOK := r.BasicAuth()
if !authOK {
if !authOK && !authorized {
http.Error(w, "Not authorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
var authorized bool
if username == s.AuthUser && password == s.AuthPass {
if !authorized && username == s.authUser && password == s.authPass {
authorized = true
}
if s.htpasswdFile != nil && !authorized {
if !authorized && s.htpasswdFile != nil {
authorized = s.htpasswdFile.Match(username, password)
}

View file

@ -45,7 +45,6 @@ type IPFilterOptions struct {
// ipFilter
type ipFilter struct {
opts IPFilterOptions
//mut protects the below
//rw since writes are rare
mut sync.RWMutex
@ -60,13 +59,12 @@ type subnet struct {
allowed bool
}
func newIPFilter(opts IPFilterOptions) *ipFilter {
func newIPFilter(opts *IPFilterOptions) *ipFilter {
if opts.Logger == nil {
flags := log.LstdFlags
opts.Logger = log.New(os.Stdout, "", flags)
}
f := &ipFilter{
opts: opts,
ips: map[string]bool{},
defaultAllowed: !opts.BlockByDefault,
}
@ -189,7 +187,7 @@ func (f *ipFilter) Wrap(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
}
// WrapIPFilter is equivalent to newIPFilter(opts) then Wrap(next)
func WrapIPFilter(next http.Handler, opts IPFilterOptions) http.Handler {
func WrapIPFilter(next http.Handler, opts *IPFilterOptions) http.Handler {
return newIPFilter(opts).Wrap(next)
}

View file

@ -295,15 +295,26 @@ func TLSConfig(cert, pk string) OptionFn {
// HTTPAuthCredentials sets basic http auth credentials
func HTTPAuthCredentials(user string, pass string) OptionFn {
return func(srvr *Server) {
srvr.AuthUser = user
srvr.AuthPass = pass
srvr.authUser = user
srvr.authPass = pass
}
}
// HTTPAuthHtpasswd sets basic http auth htpasswd file
func HTTPAuthHtpasswd(htpasswdPath string) OptionFn {
return func(srvr *Server) {
srvr.AuthHtpasswd = htpasswdPath
srvr.authHtpasswd = htpasswdPath
}
}
// HTTPAUTHFilterOptions sets basic http auth ips whitelist
func HTTPAUTHFilterOptions(options IPFilterOptions) OptionFn {
for i, allowedIP := range options.AllowedIPs {
options.AllowedIPs[i] = strings.TrimSpace(allowedIP)
}
return func(srvr *Server) {
srvr.authIPFilterOptions = &options
}
}
@ -324,11 +335,13 @@ func FilterOptions(options IPFilterOptions) OptionFn {
// Server is the main application
type Server struct {
AuthUser string
AuthPass string
AuthHtpasswd string
authUser string
authPass string
authHtpasswd string
authIPFilterOptions *IPFilterOptions
htpasswdFile *htpasswd.File
authIPFilter *ipFilter
logger *log.Logger